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2 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents, the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
(hereinafter "Board") and Gulf Oil Corp. (hereinafter "Gulf"), 
filed a petition to rehear the matter decided by this Court in 
Bennion v. Gulf, No. 19144, filed on August 19, 1985. This 
matter was an appeal of a Summary Judgment granted in favor of 
Gulf and the Board holding that the Board had proceeded and 
acted within its authority in allowing a test well to be redes-
ignated as a production well within a 640 acre drilling unit. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the lower court, vacated the 
Board's earlier Order and remanded the case to the Board with 
the instruction to enter an Order that the second well drilled 
by Gulf in the 640 acre unit of Section 8, Township 3 South, 
Range 5 West, Duchesne County, Utah, is and has been producing 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(e) (1953). Fur-
ther, this Court relieved Bennion of all obligations to share in 
the cost of drilling the second well. 
In addition to the Board's lack of statutory authority, 
this Court found that there was insufficient evidence to demon-
strate that it was more equitable and reasonable to shut in the 
first well and redesignate the second well as the production 
well. Subsequent to that decision, Gulf and the Board both 
filed petitions for rehearing in this Court. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO GRANT A 
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS WHETHER THE COURT HAS 
OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED SOME MATERIAL MATTER OF LA. 
OR FACT WHICH HAD IT BEEN GIVEN CONSIDERATION, WOULD 
LIKELY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A DIFFERENT RESULT. 
Gulf and the Board each respectively filed a petition 
for rehearing with this Court after this Court had handed down 
its decision reversing the District Court and vacating the 
Board's previous order. Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which governs a petition for rehearing, states that 
the petition shall state with particularity the points of law o: 
fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the 
petition as the petitioner so desires. 
The purpose of a petition for rehearing ... is 
to direct the court's attention to some 
material matter of law or fact which it has 
overlooked in deciding a case, and which, 
had it been given consideration, would 
probably have brought about a different 
result. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Brown and Root, 206 F.2d 73, 
74 (8th Cir. 1953). See also, Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 296 
(9th Cir. 1962). A petition for rehearing should be allowed 
only in rare instances. Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953). 
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In addition, the petition for rehearing should not 
present arguments on the merits, but rather, arguments in favor 
of the petition for rehearing. The petition is merely seeking 
leave to argue and should confine itself to a statement of the 
points overlooked. Gershenhorn v. Walter R. Stutz Enterprises, 
306 P.2d 121 (Nev. 1957). 
It should be brief and it should not be 
argumentative; it should point to the 
conflict created by or the controlling 
matter overlooked in the original decision. 
It should not be expected to also serve the 
role of persuading the court how the con-
flict or error should be resolved. That is 
the object of resubmission. The object of 
the petition is only to show that the 
petitioner is entitled to a rehearing, not 
that he is entitled to a different decision 
on the merits . 
.!i..:_, 306 P.2d at 121. 
Counsel should not be permitted to argue their cases in 
a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, where counsel has merely failed 
to previously argue a point in their briefs or their oral 
argument, such argument will not be considered when raised in 
the petition for rehearing. Smith v. Crocker First National 
Bank of San Francisco, 152 Cal. App. 2d 832, 314 P.2d 237 
(1957). 
Gulf and the Board, for the reasons stated below have 
failed to show that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any 
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material law or fact which would have changed the outcome of i' 
decision and their petition for rehearing should be denied. 
II. THE BOARD HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM THAT THE COURT OVER-
LOOKED MATERIAL LAW OR FACTS WHERE IT NEITHER FILED A 
BRIEF NOR ARGUED ORALLY. 
The Board and Gulf had ample opportunity during the 
hearing before this Court to set forth the facts and arguments 
which they deemed important in consideration of the merits of 
their case. However, the Board did not file a brief with this 
Court nor did it participate in oral argument before this Court. 
Rather, the Board's first participation in this appeal was in 
the form of a petition for rehearing after this Court had 
already heard and decided the matter. 
The court in Carr v. Federal Trade Commission, 302 F.2c 
688 (1st Cir. 1962), in facts analogous to the case at bar, 
found that an agency would not be granted a rehearing where it 
had opportunity to argue from agency orders but failed to bring 
those orders to the attention of the Court. The court stated: 
But a court cannot be expected to rummage 
among administrative writings and consent 
orders sua sponte when the party most 
directly involved and knowledgeable makes no 
suggestion that anything would be found 
there. For a governmental agency best 
familiar with its own practice with respect 
to a matter directly in issue, and now said 
to be of paramount importance, to make no 
mention of the subject until after it had 
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lost a case on another ground, if deliber-
ate, is a breach of duty to the court, if 
inadvertent, is still inexcusable. The 
Commission's petition for rehearing raising 
this allegedly vital point contains no 
mention of why it was first developed at 
this late date, let alone any apology for 
doing so. 
Id.302 F.2d at 692. 
No reason is given by the Board for its failure to file 
a brief or argue orally before the Court any of its assertions 
contained in its petition for rehearing. The Board's delay in 
making any argument at all should preclude the Board from now 
arguing in the petition for rehearing. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND ANY MATERIAL 
FACTS PRESENTED AT THE INITIAL HEARING AND PETITLONERS 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A REHEARING. 
Gulf and the Board claim that this Court misapprehended 
the following statement in the record by Gulf's witness, Mr. 
Mark Anthony. 
We have no idea what the extent of the 
reservoir is. We can't know that at this 
time. We realize that this whole field is 
-- apparently the reservoir due to the 
geological structure of the thing -- it's 
almost impossible to determine what's going 
to happen from one well to the next as far 
as correlating sands and production. 
(Bennion Reply Brief at p. 10.) 
Gulf and the Board claim that Mr. Anthony's statement 
was referring to another well, the Josephine Voda No. 2 well, 
rather than the Albert Smith No. 2 well, which is the subject 
this action. 
Bennion did not misstate the record. The Albert Smith 
No. 2 well was the subject matter of the hearing where the 
statement was made. Mr. Anthony's statement pertains to the 
geological structure of the entire reservoir and not just one 
well. Mr. Anthony states that due to the geological structure 
of the field it is almost impossible to predict the production 
from one well to the next. This statement would apply to the 
Albert Smith No. 2, the Josephine Voda No. 2 well and any othec 
well drilled within the field (the Albert Smith No. 2 well, 
although not adjacent to the Josephine Voda No. 2 well, is onl1 
one section away and is clearly within the same field). Mr. 
Anthony's statement merely indicates that the Board had 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was more equitable 
or reasonable to shut in the Albert Smith No. 1 well and 
redesignate the Albert Smith No. 2 well as the production well 
due to the uncertainty regarding the field and underlying 
reservoir. This is further illustrated by the i'act that at t"·0 
time of the hearing in the Dist:rict Court, the Albert Smith iJ, 
2 well was producing an average of only barrels per month 
compared to the 850 barrels per month that WilS pre•:ic>us ly be:· 
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produced by the Albert Smith No. 1 well. (Reply Brief of 
Bennion at p. 9.) This Court's determination that the Board had 
insufficient evidence to determine that the Albert Smith No. 2 
well should be designated as the production well for Section 8 
is easily substantiated by the record. 
Moreover, the alleged misconstrued quote was included in 
Bennion's reply brief. (Reply Brief of Bennion at p. 10.) Gulf 
and the Board had ample opportunity to argue the applicability 
of the quote at oral argument. The fact that they chose not to 
do so is not grounds for rehearing, but merely indicates Gulf 
and the Board's attempt to reargue the issues already resolved 
by this Court. 
This Court found that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support the Board's action in determining that the Albert Smith 
No. 2 well should become the production well for Section 8. In 
addition, this Court stated that its decision would be the same 
regardless of whether the Board found that the Albert Smith No. 
2 well could be a commercial well for reasons stated in Argument 
IV. 
Petitioners claim that this Court overlooked the pro-
tection being afforded to Mr. Bennion's correlative rights is 
again improper in the petition for rehearing and is without 
merit. Gulf, in its original brief filed with this Court, 
argued that the correlative rights of Mr. Bennion were being 
protected. Gulf and the Board, in their petitions for rehear-
ing, again argue that Bennion's correlative rights were being 
protected, and further attempted to show this Court that Mr. 
Bennion would be receiving greater returns from the Albert Smit: 
No. 2 well than he was previously receiving from the Albert 
Smith No. 1 well. Gulf and the Board are merely attempting to 
reargue their case on the merits. 
Under the Board's order, Mr. Bennion's correlative 
rights were not protected as evidenced by the failure of the 
Board to follow the express statutory mandates of Utah law. 
Those mandates were adopted in order to provide for the ef fi-
cient extraction of the minerals and oils and to provide for 
protection of interest owner's correlative rights. Utah Code 
Ann. §40-6-6(d) (1953). This is further indicated by the fact 
that prior to "shutting in" the Albert Smith No. 1 well, Mr. 
Bennion was receiving 100% of his interest in that well. 
Albert Smith No. 2 Well, Bennion would receive only an 
one-eighth royal interest for a substantial period of time due 
to the Board's order that Gulf recoup its drilling costs for 
this second well from 7/8ths of Bennion's interest. 
Gulf and the Board's claim that this Court misunderstC' 
the statement by Mr. Anthony and the facts presented in the 
case, is merely an attempt by Gulf and the Board to reargue t:.c 
merits of the case and is improper in a petition for rehearing 
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This Court has not overlooked or misapprehended the evidence 
presented in the initial hearing and no grounds for rehearing 
exist in this matter. The petition for rehearing filed in this 
case should therefore be denied. 
IV. THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND THE BOARD'S 
PLAN OR FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT RATHER FOUND THAT THE 
BOARD'S ACTIONS DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH'S STATUTES. 
Gulf and the Board, in their petitions for rehearing, 
argue that this Court overlooked and failed to perceive the 
Board's statutory authority under Section 40-6-6(d) to authorize 
the drilling of additional wells pursuant to a "reasonably 
uniform plan in the pool or any zone thereof". This argument by 
petitioners is incorrect and does not justify Gulf and the 
Board's motion for rehearing. 
This Court, in deciding the case, not only recognized 
the authority granted in Section 40-6-6(d), but even cited that 
section in its decision. After citing the section, this Court 
found that the Board's order "did not authorize the drilling of 
additional wells on a uniform plan in the pool or any zone 
thereof''. Gulf and the Board's claim that this Court overlooked 
the above section is clearly unfounded as evidenced by this 
Court's citation and consideration of Section 40-6-6(d) in the 
Court's opinion itself. 
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Gulf and the Board iurther allege that the Board was 
acting pursuant to a plan and that this Court failed to percei 
the Board's plan. This claim by Gulf and the Board is again 
incorrect and improper in this petition for rehearing. Gulf 
the Board had every opportunity to present their argument to 
this Court. Their claim is that the Board acted pursuant to a 
plan in authorizing for drilling and designating the Albert 
Smith No. 2 Well as the producing well for the unit. As previ-
ously noted, the Board declined to file any brief with this 
Court or to make any argument regarding any matter when given 
the opportunity before this Court. Gulf, in its brief, did no: 
argue that the Board was acting pursuant to statutory authoric: 
and pursuant to a reasonably uniform plan. As stated above, 
issues which were not raised in the brief or in oral argument 
are not properly brought up for the first time in a motion for 
rehearing. 
Gulf and the Board, by claiming in their petition for 
rehearing, that the Board was acting pursuant to a plan and thi 
the Court failed to perceive such plan, are simply trying to 
reargue the merits of the case, rather than to show that this 
Court has overlooked some material law or fact which would 
change the outcome of the case. In addition, Cult and the 
Board's claim that the Board was acting pur3uant to a reasonJt 
uniform plan is without merit. 
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Gulf and the Board claim that the Board was acting 
pursuant to a plan which was evidenced by the orders entered by 
the Board regarding Section 8. Petitioners would have this 
Court believe that the Board's actions regarding Section 8, only 
one of many sections within the Altamont Bluebell Region, 
constitutes the Board's reasonably uniform plan in the pool or 
any zone thereof. Petitioners, in making such an argument, seem 
to be placing the horse before the cart. The statutory authori-
ty granted in Section 40-6-6(d) states that the Board may 
"authorize the drilling of additional wells if done pursuant to 
a reasonable uniform plan in the pool or zone thereof". The 
statute contemplates the existence of a plan prior to the 
drilling of additional wells. In this case, the Board 
authorized the drilling of an additional well prior to any 
formulation or adoption by way of modification of the Board's 
original order in 139-8 which had adopted a uniform plan for the 
drilling of only one well per section. 
Gulf and the Board's characterization of the Board's 
actions as being the plan itself, is not in harmony with the 
mandates of Section 40-6-6(d) and does not support the Board's 
actions in this matter. That was exactly the finding by this 
Court where it stated in its opinion that the Board's order did 
not authorize the drilling of additional wells on a "uniform 
plan in the pool or any zone thereof". 
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